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Abstract 
 
Exploiting a unique data set created in 1998 on a sample of 228 public, 
nonprofit and for-profit organizations working in the social service sector, and on 
2066 workers, the paper seeks to demonstrate that workers’ satisfaction and 
loyalty to the organization is influenced by the incentive mixes offered by 
different organizational forms. Nonprofit organizations are found to give more 
weight to intrinsic and relational aspects of the work than to monetary aspects. 
They tend to pay lower wages and to produce a mix of incentives based on non-
monetary rewards compared to public bodies and for-profit enterprises. The role 
of distributive and procedural fairness will be investigated as well. Fairness 
emerges as a crucial factor which influences both satisfaction and loyalty. 
Besides this general result, procedural justice is found to be the most important 
determinant of workers’ general satisfaction with their jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
Social enterprises, especially those engaged in the continuous delivery of social 
services, comprise various type of non-profit organization, of which especially 
widespread in Italy are social cooperatives. Among nonprofit organizations (NPOs 
hereafter), which include religious and non-religious nonprofits, some of which take the 
form of foundations, associations, or moral bodies, social cooperatives grew to a 
remarkable extent during the 1990s. In that period, an increasing number of social 
enterprises assumed the form of quasi-workers’ cooperatives with a non-profit 
distribution constraint (although this is not necessarily absolute).1 
In more general terms, the evolution of entrepreneurial nonprofit cannot be explained 
solely on the basis of non-profit theories which concentrate on the existence of 
information asymmetries between producers and consumers.2 This is for two reasons. 
First because the services supplied are often private or collective goods, but with 
repeated consumption and therefore with limited information asymmetry problems. 
Second because in the case of enterprises wholly or largely owned by the workers, any 
profit distribution constraint loses much of its significance, given the ability of these 
enterprises to evade it by increasing the remuneration of their workers. Indeed, if they 
take on self-interested, rational and optimizing workers, one would expect these forms 
of enterprise to be more likely to exploit information asymmetries or incomplete 
contracts with consumers in favor of their workers. This behavior can be mitigated only 
by the presence of voluntary workers or users with strong decision-making powers. 
However, empirical analysis shows that these are often not present in these 
organizations, and that when they are, often they do not occupy important positions in 
the governance structure. Furthermore, both workers and managers in non-profit 
organizations (traditional as well as those owned by workers and/or volunteers) are 
invariably paid less than are the workers and managers in public organizations 
delivering the same or similar services, and that they are not normally paid more than 
those working in for-profit enterprises. Moreover, social enterprises do not seem to 
grant their workers more fringe benefits than do the other types of organization.3  
An alternative theory is that the existence of social enterprises entails that efficiency 
is tied to the sharing and fulfillment of ‘social missions’, and it may be greatly reduced 
by opportunistic behavior (Besley and Ghatak, 2003; Grimalda and Sacconi, 2003). This 
idea reflects some of the most recent literature on NPOs and social enterprises (Sacconi, 
2000; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Anheier and Ben-Ner, 2003). This kind of 
explanation works well only if workers join the organization in a voluntary way and are 
not tied to it for exclusively economic reasons. When workers choose the organization 
because of lack of alternatives, economic motivations are paramount and the mission 
may be shared only formally.  
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 We may now take some further steps forward by enriching the base hypotheses in 
two ways: 
a. the first: by hypothesizing individuals (workers) who are not completely 
self-interested and above all not necessary opportunistic (‘ideological workers’, to 
paraphrase Rose-Ackerman, 1987, 1996; but see also Turati, 2001, on the role of 
altruism and interpersonal relations) with more complex utility functions, i.e. not 
restricted to the free time/wage trade-off, and also interested in non-monetary 
benefits that are the result of collective more than individual choices. In addition to 
this is study of the role of fairness and reciprocity in behaviors not relatable to pure 
self-interest (Fehr and Gachter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2001); 
b. second: by considering the enterprise as a flexible incentives structure 
able to utilize not only monetary and economic incentives but also to satisfy other 
needs (moral, ideological, cultural, relational, etc.) of the stakeholders – the workers 
in particular – and to make these structures functional to the particular 
circumstances in which they operate, selecting stakeholders and developing their 
various propensities (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001, 2003; Borzaga and Depedri, 
2004). 
Figure 1 shows the new hypothesis in the form of a flow chart. Added to the 
traditional arguments linked to the presence of asymmetric information in the 
production of public utility services, and of incomplete contracts and 
multidimensionality of services provided, is a third element which completes the 
picture. Altruistic or only partially self-interested workers will participate in the 
production of social services without requiring competitive wages if a proper incentive 
system emphasizing intrinsic and relational goods is established. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
By introducing these two hypotheses it is possible to propose an interpretation of 
non-profit organizations and in particular of worker- (and volunteer-) owned social 
enterprises able to explain the recent evolution of the third sector in Italy and Europe. 
On this interpretation, these organizations are complex and distinctive structures of 
extrinsic and intrinsic incentives which serve to attract workers who are not exclusively 
attracted by monetary remuneration. The extrinsic incentives certainly include 
remuneration, although this is not necessarily the most important of them. Moreover, 
one should also consider relative pay-levels, expectations and the workers’ perception 
of the fairness of the wages structure. 
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 The intrinsic incentives comprise the perceived degree of fulfillment of the firm’s 
social mission, the transparency of the organizational structure, opportunities for 
workers to accomplish moral or ideological aspirations, and finally the consumption of 
relational goods (or positive relations) on the job. The ensuing mix of incentives curbs 
possible opportunistic behavior by establishing implicit contracts based on enterprise 
culture (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 2001). 
The importance of these various aspects has been emphasized by several authors, and 
their presence has been tested by empirical research on workers in non-profit 
organizations. Some authors have stressed the importance of workers’ attitudes and 
motivations (Mirvis, 1992), others have investigated the presence and importance of 
non-monetary rewards (Almod and Kendall, 2000), both extrinsic like greater 
opportunities for training and greater worker flexibility (Almond and Kendall, 2000) 
and intrinsic like involvement in the organization’s activity and management, the 
sociality of work, etc. Moreover, several authors have analyzed the perception of greater 
fairness in wage structures and, more generally, in the incentives structures of NPOs 
(Levine, 1991; Leete, 2000). 
Research has generally confirmed that worker satisfaction with these incentives 
structures is high (and mostly higher than in other organizations) even in the presence of 
wage levels lower than in competing enterprises (Mirvis, 1992; Borzaga and Musella, 
2003; Borzaga and Depedri, 2004). Moreover, workers seem more willing to ‘donate 
work’ and more loyal to the organization than are workers in other organizations 
(Almond and Kendall, 2000, Borzaga and Depedri, 2004).4  
None of the authors mentioned, however, has sought to identify all the elements in 
the incentives structures adopted by non-profits and in particular by worker- and/or 
volunteer-owned non-profits. In the majority of cases, they do no more than emphasize 
only one or a few of them. 
We intend to remedy this shortcoming by drawing from the theoretical and empirical 
literature the largest possible number of components of these incentives structures, 
seeking to specify how non-profit organizations in general and worker-owned ones in 
particular make use of them. In describing these various components, besides the 
literature, we shall draw on data collected by a survey conducted in Italy in 1998 on the 
social services sector.5 
The aim is to initiate a new theoretical approach characterizing different 
organizational forms on the basis of the incentive mixes they devise in order to motivate 
workers. To this end, an innovative approach is used which considers workers’ 
perceived satisfaction and justice, and exploits a unique data set. Incentive mixes are 
described not only in terms of the the absolute amount of monetary rewards but also in 
those of the perceived fairness of procedures and relative remuneration. We find a 
significant difference in incentive mixes across organizational forms (worker owned 
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 nonprofits, other nonprofits, for-profit firms, and public organizations) but much 
stronger differences in perceived justice, which appears to be most important 
determinant of workers’ satisfaction.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a more detailed description of the 
elements of incentive mixes which will be considered; Section 3 introduces the 
empirical part of the paper, describing the data and sampling procedures and 
highlighting the general features of the organizations concerned; Section 4 examines the 
main features of workers’ attitudes to work and of their choice of the organization. 
Section 5 comprises the bulk of the work. Ordered probit and logit estimations will be 
conducted to identify the elements influencing workers’ satisfaction and loyalty to the 
organization. Moreover, extrinsic, intrinsic, and relational incentives will be described 
in more depth. Principal components analysis will be performed on the items of 
satisfaction in order to single out second level or hidden dimensions characterizing 
incentive mixes. Section 6 addresses the issue of distributive and procedural fairness in 
influencing workers’ satisfaction and loyalty to the organization. The role and weight of 
fairness is assessed by means of new probit and logit estimates. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. An overview of the components of the incentive structures for workers 
A cross-wise reading of theoretical and empirical studies yields the main components 
of the incentives structures designed to induce workers to share the enterprise culture 
and to reduce opportunistic behavior. These components can be grouped under three 
headings: 
a. extrinsic incentives consisting of economic benefits paid in exchange for 
work performance. They divide into two categories: monetary incentives (the wage) 
and non-monetary ones (professional growth, job security, working hours 
compatible with workers’ needs; career advancement; the working environment), 
b. intrinsic incentives consisting in the contents and features of the work 
which coincide with the workers’ intrinsic motivations and permit their maximum 
expression (for example, the creativity of the work, fulfillment of the workers’ 
aspirations, opportunities to take active part in the organization’s activities through 
various forms of participation, and the democratic features of the governance 
structure); 
c. relational incentives consisting of opportunities for workers to engage in 
meaningful relations with each other, with the managers, and with the users: these 
may be considered to be a part of the workers’ remuneration which is consumed 
directly on the job and therefore reduces disutility (Borzaga and Depedri, 2004). 
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According to the recent literature on fairness and reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter, 2000, 
2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 2001), for each type of incentive it is important to evaluate not 
only absolute levels and their relations with worker well-being (approximated in our 
case by the level of satisfaction) – relations which are not always linear – but also (and 
especially) the relative levels and perception of fairness in the distribution of incentives 
held by workers. The literature introduces the concept of distributive fairness to analyze 
workers’ perception of fairness in their economic treatment, this being evaluated in 
respect of both the organization’s characteristics and the personal and occupational ones 
of the workers themselves. On the other hand, procedural fairness (Benz and Stutzer, 
2002; Benz, Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2004) will be examined on the 
basis of transparency in career processes and in decision-making, in internal 
communication and the balance between what the worker supplies to the organization 
and what the latter provides as remuneration (not only economic) for the worker.  
Having thus defined the incentives structure, we may now verify the extent to which 
individual types of incentive are used, conducting specific analysis of worker-owned 
non-profit organizations (social cooperatives) and other nonprofits, and comparing it 
with analysis of the other organizational types. A stringent methodological question in 
this context is how worker utility is to be measured at the empirical level. The 
traditional economic view requires utility to be inferred from observed behavior, not 
measured directly. Here, a different approach will be adopted which uses self-reported 
satisfaction scores and intentions to stay with the organization as success indicators. 
This may not be the standard methodology in economics, but satisfaction measures are 
increasingly accepted as suitable proxies for utility (Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 
2002; Benz and Stutzer, 2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2004). 
Two indexes of procedural and distributive fairness will be added to the traditional 
variables already present  in the literature mentioned. This will be done in order to 
determine whethjer they help explain workers’ satisfaction and loyalty. It will be of 
particular importance to check whether fairness adds to the other variables associated 
with satisfaction, or whether it replaces them. If fairness replaces the other variables, it 
can be equated to and compared with them as if it were a ‘second level’ incentive mix. 
If it does not, then it ought to be better interpreted as an independent criterion used by 
workers to assess the organization’s ability to satisfy them and to make them more 
loyal. In this latter case, fairness would pertain to the realm of satisfaction with 
processes more than to the realm of satisfaction with outcomes, since satisfaction with 
outcomes is already included among the initial regressors. These hypotheses will be 
tested in section 6 by means of ordered probit analysis. 
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 3. The research: structure and main results 
The research whose results are discussed in this paper was conducted in 1998 on a 
homogeneous sector in Italy: that of social-welfare and educational services. It involved 
228 organizations (for a total of 268 operational units) operating in 15 Italian provinces 
and with different organizational forms. Beside public bodies and for-profit firms, 
nonprofit organizations were sorted into three different groups: social cooperatives, 
non-religious and religious non-profit organizations. 
Separate questionnaires were administered to the organization (and its operational 
units), the paid workers, the managers, and voluntary workers to collect information on 
a total of 2066 paid workers, 266 managers, and 724 volunteers. The questions enabled 
important and detailed information to be gathered on both the general characteristics of 
the organization and the occupational, socio-demographic features of workers and their 
well-being. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the workers involved in the study: 
the strong predominance of female workers is immediately apparent and evidences a 
kind of protection granted by the social service sector to the weaker and less employable 
social groups. Workers are quite young, being usually 30 to 39 years old. The 
predominant educational qualification is a high-school diploma, and part-time 
employment contracts are much more common than full-time ones. This result is at odd 
with the general Italian situation, where long-term contracts are the rule. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The data enabled analysis to be made of the mix of incentives in terms of the 
workers’ expectations (i.e. their motivations). This analysis was made possible by 
examination of two behavioral features of workers: satisfaction and loyalty to the 
organization. The former enables investigation of the subjective level of utility obtained 
from the job as regards both material aspects and, especially, intrinsic and relational 
ones. The latter enables investigation of the relation among motivation, satisfaction and 
desire to stay with the organization, and it is an indicator of the capacity of the 
incentives mix to involve workers and to satisfy their needs, increasing their 
commitment to the enterprise’s mission and their sense of belonging to the group. 
In regard to these two aspects, the sector’s distinctive features and the differences 
among organizational types should be borne in mind. As far as the general features of 
satisfaction are concerned (Table 2), workers in the sector as a whole are sufficiently 
satisfied with their jobs. The workers with the highest level of satisfaction are those in 
the religious nonprofits, followed by the employees of social cooperatives, for-profits 
and the other non-religious nonprofits. Public-sector employees are the least satisfied 
with their work in general. 
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Table 2 about here 
 
As regards loyalty, the differences among organizational types should be principally 
borne in mind (Table 3). It emerges that the majority of workers in nonprofits, 
especially if religious or other non-religious nonprofits, strongly desire to stay with the 
organization as long as possible. The percentage is slightly lower in for-profit 
enterprises and social cooperatives, but it is in public organizations that the percentage 
of workers wanting to remain as long as possible is much the lowest, though, even when 
they want to change their sector of activity, they prefer to stay employed in the public 
sector. In the case of social cooperatives this negative result is partly off-set by a high 
percentage of workers wanting to remain with their organizations for at least some 
years, while in that of the for-profit and the public organizations this off-setting factor is 
not present. Consequently, for-profit enterprises and public agencies have not negligible 
percentages of workers intending to leave the organization but wanting to stay in the 
same sector. 
 
Table 3. about here 
 
Finally to be considered is pay. A result already obtained by empirical research is 
specification of the different wage structures that characterize nonprofits. All studies 
have shown that pay is lower in nonprofits than in public organizations producing the 
same services (Levine, 1991; Leete, 2000). This is not so compared to for-profit 
enterprises, however, especially when similar activities are considered. Indeed, it has 
been reported (Almond and Kendall, 2000) that in particular situations (wages much 
below the national average), nonprofits seem to ‘protect’ their workers by paying them 
higher wages than do for-profit organizations.  
Our research confirms these findings (Table 4). Wages are much lower in private 
organizations than in public ones. The minimum levels are reached in social 
cooperatives and religious nonprofits, followed by for-profit enterprises. The wages 
paid by the latter, however, are on average lower than those paid by non-religious 
nonprofits, so that one may conclude that, as shown by previous studies, in certain cases 
nonprofits can protect their workers better than for-profits also at the level of monetary 
remuneration.6  
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 Table 4. about here 
 
The implications of wage differences among types of organizations in the same 
sector, and the possibility of off-setting monetary shortfalls with various kinds of 
incentive (mainly intrinsic and relational but also non-monetary extrinsic), will be 
examined in the next sections. 
 
4. Motivations 
Few authors have examined the motivations that induce workers to choose one 
particular job rather than any other (Pagano, 1985; Frey, 1997). Separate analysis of 
attitudes towards work and the reasons for choosing a specific organization sheds useful 
light on the motives that induce workers to prefer a particular sector and a particular 
organization. As regards the former, the survey (Table 4) shows that workers in the 
social services sector see their work principally as a means to earn a living, i.e. as a 
necessity and as a way to help their families. Nevertheless, they also give great 
importance to the socio-relational aspects of their work: indeed, they believe it to be an 
opportunity for self-fulfillment and for relating with others. Above all, however, 
attitudes by workers in the sector are very homogeneous, regardless of whether they are 
employed by public agencies, for-profit enterprises or nonprofit organizations. This is 
indicative of a shared position vis-à-vis the sector as a whole, i.e. of a general interest 
among workers in the activities of the social services sector. In fact, the motivational 
item given the highest score (and therefore the greatest importance), both on average for 
the sample and for each type of organization,7 was interest in the sector. 
More interesting, however, is analysis of the reasons why workers decide to work for 
a particular type of organization. In general, workers choose their organization mainly 
because they are attracted by the sector in which it operates. But a certain influence is 
also exerted by approval of the way in which the organization works with users, the 
coherence of the job with training, and its compatibility with other commitments. 
Features that are instead of minor importance in determining the choice of an 
organization are the pay and the career prospects that it offers. 
Of considerable importance are the marked differences among the workers in the 
various types of organization, and very different motivations are apparent, firstly among 
public, for-profit and non-profit organizations, and secondly among nonprofits 
themselves. As regards the former features, the employees of public organizations are 
(slightly) less attracted by the way in which those organizations work with users, while 
workers in for-profit enterprises give greater importance to extrinsic motivations 
(especially job security). As regards the latter aspect, i.e. the difference among types of 
nonprofits, it is workers at social cooperatives that display the most distinctive features 
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 (Table 5) in that they give most importance to involvement in the organization and in 
management decisions, but also to interest in the sector and the way in which the 
organization works with users. The specific strength of social cooperatives is therefore 
their ability to attract personnel interested not only in working in the social services 
sector but also in being involved in the organization,8 and in the possibility of 
influencing its decisions and policies. 
Despite these differences, all workers in the sector seemingly give little importance to 
pay and career, or to the fact that their job was the only one available. They regard its 
match with education and its compatibility with other commitments as much more 
important. 
 
Tab.5. about here 
5. The mix of incentives  
Remunerating workers means, especially in a sector where social and relational 
commitment are highly significant, creating mixes of incentives which ensure workers’ 
satisfaction and socio-relational as well as economic well-being, and matching the 
motivations which induced them to work in that particular sector with that particular 
organization. Consequently, the elements to be considered when discussing incentive 
structures and forms of worker remuneration are numerous and not always directly 
measurable. 
From this point of view, the correlation among workers’ motivations, the mix of 
incentives offered by the organization, and satisfaction and loyalty to the organization 
can be tested by means of two models: one centred on satisfaction, which considers the 
influence of motivational aspects; the other intended to investigate the influence of 
satisfaction with various aspects of the work on loyalty. 
Satisfaction with the job as a whole was analyzed by means of an ordered probit 
model (Table 6). Among workers’ personal characteristics the level of education 
influences satisfaction negatively, with more educated workers being significantly less 
satisfied. Also tenure in the organization, in terms of number of years, negatively 
influences satisfaction. Tenure may influence satisfaction negatively because initial 
enthusiasm may decrease as time passes. On the other hand, workers’ gender and age do 
not influence satisfaction. Working in direct contact with clients increases satisfaction, 
both in terms of presence or absence and in terms of intensity (number of hours spent 
with client).  
The hourly wage is not significant: satisfaction with the job as a whole is 
uncorrelated with the level of monetary remuneration. This is partly explained by 
heterogeneous worker expectations. Only when expectations are fulfilled will monetary 
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 remuneration positively contribute to workers satisfaction.9 Furthermore, some workers 
may be dissatisfied with their wage. However, the percentage of workers giving high 
importance to monetary remuneration seems to be limited since the social service sector 
has, on average, lower wage levels. Workers attracted mainly by monetary remuneration 
are likely to select against the sector.10  
Among organizational characteristics, the presence of volunteers and good relations 
between organization and clients do not influence workers’ satisfaction. Finally, the 
public nature of organizations reduces satisfaction significantly: private organizations 
seem able to offer better incentive mixes to workers. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The last group of variables reflects workers’ attitudes toward work as spelled out in 
Table 4. Intrinsic and relational attitudes are those that best support higher satisfaction. 
Which means that workers driven by deeper motivations and by the desire to build 
positive social relations on the job are more likely to be satisfied with their work. The 
result is more striking when the negative linkage between economic attitudes and 
general satisfaction is added: workers driven by economic motivations are less satisfied 
with their work. It may be that jobs in the social service sector leave workers motivated 
by economic considerations particularly unsatisfied, so that the result cannot be 
generalized. However, the different impacts of different kinds of attitudes should be 
stressed. Finally, non-monetary extrinsic attitudes are non correlated with workers’ 
satisfaction. 
The second model (Table 7) concerns the elements influencing workers’ loyalty to 
the organization. Two logit estimations were produced. 
 
Table 7. about here 
 
In the first model the dependent variable corresponds to workers’ desire to stay with 
the organization as long as possible. As far as personal characteristics are concerned, the 
intention to stay is positively related to workers’ age, but negatively to the level of 
education: younger and educated workers tend to be less loyal, probably because 
younger workers have not yet found a stable occupation, while educated workers more 
often take other job opportunities into consideration. Workers on open-ended contract 
are more loyal than workers on fixed-term contracts. An interesting interplay between 
 12
 the stability of the job and loyalty is highlighted. Open-ended contracts are likely to 
decrease frictions between worker and organization. On the other hand, gender is not 
relevant to loyalty,11 although men seem to prefer to stay with the organization at least 
for some years longer than women. Tenure in the organization is weakly linked with 
loyalty only for workers who intend to stay as long as possible. 
As for organizational variables, the presence of volunteers (indexed by their number) 
does not have any influence on workers’ loyalty, whereas the quality of relations 
between organization and clients is likely to increase it, but only for workers who intend 
to stay with the organization as long as possible. As in the case of worker satisfaction, 
there is no relationship between the level of the wage and workers’ loyalty. Another 
important result is that workers in public organizations are less loyal than workers in 
private (for-profit and non-profit) organizations, even if the former usually have more 
stable jobs and higher wages. 
Looking at satisfaction and motivations, there is a close relation between workers’ 
loyalty on the one hand, and satisfaction with extrinsic, economic and relational goods 
on the other: the more workers’ are satisfied, the more they are loyal to the organization. 
As shown in more detail by Borzaga and Depedri (2004) extrinsic (both economic and 
non-economic) and relational satisfaction are likely to correspond to two different kinds 
of incentives. Both kinds of remuneration positively affect workers’ desire to stay with 
the organization.12 
On the other hand, Borzaga and Depedri (2004) also show that intrinsic satisfaction 
does not significantly influence loyalty. One possible interpretation of this result is that 
intrinsic satisfaction is not to be considered a form of worker remuneration, hence its 
linkage with loyalty is weaker: workers satisfied with the intrinsic aspects of the job 
may prefer to quit if pay is too low or relations have deteriorated. The same logit 
estimation also shows that the link between loyalty and motivations is weaker. Intrinsic 
motivations do not significantly influence loyalty. Previous elaborations showed that 
neither do extrinsic, economic and relational motivations influence loyalty.13 The upshot 
is that incentives, both in the form of economic incentives and relational goods, have a 
stronger influence on loyalty than motivations.14   
To sum up, intrinsic and relational attitudes are likely to support higher satisfaction, 
while economic attitudes decrease job satisfaction. In its turn, satisfaction (intrinsic, 
economic, and relational) impacts heavily on workers’ loyalty to the organization. 
 
5.1. The role of extrinsic incentives 
The extrinsic remuneration offered by the organizations to their workers consists not 
only of pay, which, as shown, is not correlated with worker satisfaction and loyalty to 
the organization, but also of other non-monetary yet economic aspects of work (Table 
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 8). Workers’ well-being therefore depends, on the extrinsic side, on the satisfaction that 
they derive directly from the wage, job security, the work environment, working hours 
and possibilities of career advancement. Analyzing these aspects yields a more detailed 
picture of how extrinsic incentives other than wage not only have direct repercussions 
on job satisfaction but are able to respond just as much as pay, or even more so, to 
workers’ expectations and interests (i.e. initial motivations). 
In regard to these other extrinsic aspects of work, public-sector employees are once 
again the least satisfied. In nonprofits, there is greatest satisfaction with professional 
development (which is particularly appreciated in social cooperatives) and with working 
hours schedules which enable workers (the majority of whom are female) to reconcile 
work with family commitments. The extrinsic aspect of greatest satisfaction to workers 
in for-profit enterprises is the work environment. As far as career advancement is 
concerned, levels of satisfaction are somewhat low in all types of organization, but once 
again the lowest ones are recorded in the public sector. Moreover, and quite 
unexpectedly, levels of satisfaction in nonprofit organizations are higher than in for-
profit enterprises (especially in social cooperatives and religious nonprofits) as regards 
both career progress already achieved and future expectations, probably because 
nonprofits are dynamic and many workers expect to reach high levels in the hierarchical 
structure. The overall picture is a rather composite one, and it is hard to detect a general 
trend in worker satisfaction for extrinsic aspects of the job, apart from the fact that 
public organizations seem to be at a disadvantage in many respects. 
 
Table 8. about here 
 
5.2. Intrinsic incentives 
The importance of non-economic (i.e. social) incentives emerges clearly when the 
scores given for satisfaction with the intrinsic aspects of work (Table 9) are analyzed. In 
fact, the workers declared that they gained high levels of satisfaction from intrinsic 
aspects of their work. The items which received the highest scores in this respect were 
the social utility of the work and its variety and creativity. The other intrinsic aspects of 
the work also received scores invariably above the average. 
As for differences among types of organization, most satisfied with intrinsic aspects 
were workers in social cooperatives, who gave higher scores to all these aspects of 
work, except for its social utility. The latter was particularly appreciated in the other 
nonprofit organizations, but also in for-profits, especially in respect to the other items of 
intrinsic satisfaction. Workers in social cooperatives are particularly attracted by the 
intrinsic aspects of their work and maintain that organizations offer them satisfactory 
mixes of incentives.15 In public bodies, by contrast, even if intrinsic attitudes toward 
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 work are as strong as in the other organizational forms, workers are less satisfied. The 
difference is most marked with respect to nonprofit organizations, while for-profit firms 
lie in between the two. 
 
Table 9. about here 
 
5.3. Relational incentives 
Satisfaction is not connected solely with the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the job; 
it is also correlated with opportunities to establish relations of trust, knowledge and 
collaboration with other persons (internal and external to the organization). This is an 
aspect of particular importance also because it has only recently been subjected to 
systematic analysis (Gui and Sugden, 2004; Borzaga and  Depedri, 2004). Secondly, 
relational aspects engender a sense of group belonging, of involvement in the 
organization’s mission, and of integration into the productive structure. Finally, 
relations are essential for the production of services like social ones where productivity 
and efficiency are evaluated mainly in qualitative, human and therefore relational terms. 
Analysis of satisfaction with the relational items (Table 10) shows that workers in the 
social services sector are very satisfied with their relationships with colleagues, 
volunteers and also superiors. Besides the constantly high level of satisfaction among 
workers in religious nonprofits, to be noted is the presence of very positive relations in 
all the private organizations, where they are reported to be very good with superiors 
(although there is a slightly lower level of satisfaction in other non-religious nonprofits) 
and especially with colleagues. In public organizations, instead, bureaucracy and 
hierarchy seemingly cause the worst relations, and the most frictions, especially with 
superiors. 
 
Table 10 about here 
 
5.4. A synthesis 
The sorting of the various typologies of incentives described so far and their 
relevance are confirmed by principal components analysis,16 which yielded the 
coefficients shown in Table 11. Three components are significant17 and they evidence 
the existence of distinct second level or hidden dimensions in the analysis of the items 
of satisfaction. The first components group together extrinsic and relational goods, the 
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 second component includes the items concerning intrinsic incentives,18 while the third 
component referes to purely economic incentives.19 
 
Table 11. about here 
 
Relational and extrinsic (both economic and non-economic) incentives belong to the 
first component, and therefore define the first dimension. To be noted is that the 
analysis is unable to sort relational and extrinsic (mostly non-economic) incentives into 
different groups, despite their different economic natures (monetary vs non-monetary). 
Their grouping within the same component shows that they can be compared, and that 
workers may be induced to choose the organization on the basis of the mix of relational 
and extrinsic goods offered. Table 6 showed that satisfaction with extrinsic and 
relational goods is most likely to influence workers’ loyalty. The two results taken 
together confirm that on-the-job consumption of these goods is taken by workers as 
constituting a unique incentive mix, which proves to be the most important.20 In other 
words, a trade-off between relational and extrinsic incentives can be hypothesized 
(Borzaga and Depedri, 2004). Different organizational forms may be characterized by 
different provisions of the two kinds of incentives, pointing up different capabilities and 
costs in providing them. Each kind of organization will provide the least costly 
incentive mix resulting in multiple and potentially efficient organizational equilibria. 
Intrinsic incentives, which are comprised in the second dimension, compactly define a 
unique class of incentives for workers, though it must be borne in mind that they did not 
influence significantly workers’ loyalty. Purely economic incentives (pay and career 
advancement) are found in the third component and appear to be relatively less 
important in characterizing workers’ well-being.21 
 
6. Fairness 
Thus far, the paper has concentrated on the main features of incentives mixes in the 
various organizational forms. However, the mere difference in incentive mixes 
highlighted thus far is not marked enough to account for the differences in the overall 
levels of worker satisfaction observed across organizational forms. Significant 
differences in workers’ satisfaction were observed for intrinsic and relational goods, 
which favored NPOs and disfavored public organizations and, to a lesser extent, for-
profit firms. The latter were characterized by a higher supply of extrinsic goods. Indeed, 
it is possible to hypothesize that worker satisfaction is not influenced solely by the 
composition of the incentives mix, but also, and in some cases especially, by the 
perception that the distribution of incentives among workers, proportionally to their 
responsibility and commitment, is fair. Authors have talked in this regard of perceived 
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 fairness (Thibaut and Walzer, 1975; Lynd and Tyler, 1988; Benz, Frey and Stutzer, 
2002; Frey and Stutzer, 2004). Distributive justice can be defined as the relation 
between inputs and outputs in comparison to the same relation for a certain reference 
group. If outcomes are distributed fairly the ratio of outputs to inputs would tend to 
equalize across individuals (Adams, 1963, 1965; Solari, 2003). On the other hand, 
procedural justice is usually referred to as a property of relations which guarantee fair 
outcomes, but it can also be referred to the quality of procedures, for example as long as 
the circulation of information is concerned, disregarding outcomes (Tyler and Blader, 
2000; Solari, 2003). Our data enabled us to examine both types of fairness: two indexes 
of distributive and procedural fairness were calculated and added to the other 
independent variables influencing workers’ satisfaction and loyalty. 
Descriptive analysis of distributive and procedural fairness by type of organization 
(Table 12) shows that, in general, differences among the values for distributive fairness 
are not as marked as those for procedural fairness. Indeed, public organizations show a 
significant disadvantage also as far as the perception of distributive fairness is 
concerned. Workers in public organizations are less satisfied with all the items of 
distributive fairness, their higher income notwithstanding, while workers’ satisfaction in 
for-profit firms lies in between public and nonprofit organizations. A pronounced 
difference is found as regards the perception of financial constraints undergone by the 
organization: workers in social cooperatives seem to be much more aware of financial 
constraints than are those in other organizational forms. 
The most marked differences among types of organization is apparent in the 
perception of procedural fairness. In particular, workers in social cooperatives give 
higher scores to the items of procedural fairness22 than do those in all the other 
organizations. This perception of greater fairness is influenced by the transparency of 
the organizational model due also to worker involvement in the management of the 
organization. The main differences are those between social cooperatives and public 
organizations. It is the workers in the latter, in fact, that give the lowest scores to almost 
all the items for procedural fairness, expressing themselves as especially dissatisfied 
with the balance between remuneration and contribution to the organization and as not 
satisfied with forms of communication, career profiles and opportunities for 
professional growth. Low procedural fairness, and therefore the inadequacy of incentive 
structures may crowd out intrinsic work incentives and induce workers to demand and 
managers to concede, increasing extrinsic incentives (Frey, 1997). However, higher 
wages are not sufficient to induce a perception of greater distributive justice. 
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 Table 12 about here 
 
In order to evaluate the role and weight of procedural and distributive perceived 
fairness for workers’ satisfaction and desire to stay with the organization, we again 
produced the estimates presented in Tables 5 and 6, adding the two indexes23 
representing fairness. Our comments will be restricted to the main differences with 
respect to the previous estimates, which are reported together with the new estimates in 
Tables 13 and 14.  
When workers’ satisfaction with job as a whole is considered, it is immediately 
evident that the link between the indexes representing justice and satisfaction is indeed 
strong. Procedural and distributive fairness record the highest values for the Z statistics, 
and procedural fairness emerges as the main determinant of worker satisfaction. 
Workers pay close attention to the way in which their working position is managed by 
their superiors, and to the rules followed in deciding on task assignment and career 
advancement. Workers declare themselves most satisfied when the organizational and 
decision-making model adopted by the organization is transparent and impartial. 
Distributive fairness, too, is closely correlated with workers’ satisfaction. And fairness 
in deciding on wages and the intensity of effort is also important from the workers’ 
point of view. The participatory character of many firms working in the social services 
sector, like social cooperatives, needs to be taken into account. It is possible that 
workers in this sector are particularly sensitive to issues concerning justice, and the 
emerging relation is strong indeed.   
 
Table 13 about here 
 
The differences with previous estimates evidence a decrease in the significance of the 
activity in direct contact with clients and of tenure. Also the nature (public vs private) 
becomes insignificant. The latter result is likely to have important implications for 
relations between the nature of organizations and the procedural and distributive 
fairness of processes taking place within them. Indeed, it seems that fairness is a good 
proxy for the nature of the organization, which is replaced as the main element 
influencing worker satisfaction. As shown by Table 12, the public sector records the 
lowest levels of procedural and distributive fairness. Hence its negative role in 
influencing workers’ satisfaction is partially summarized by the indexes of fairness.24 
Also to be noted is that the value of the Z statistic for intrinsic attitudes reduces 
significantly after the two indexes of fairness are introduced, although the variables 
remain significant. This may mean that strongly motivated workers tend to perceive a 
more equitable environment.25 
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 Similar results are obtained as regards the impact of justice on workers’ loyalty to the 
organization. Only those concerning workers’ desire to stay with the organization as 
long as possible are discussed here.26 The indexes of justice, both procedural and 
distributive, are again significant at the 1 percent level, though the values of the Z 
statistic highlight that the result was comparatively lower than in the case of 
satisfaction. Fairness is again one of the main factors influencing the strength of the 
relation between worker and organization. This time the role played by distributive 
fairness seems to be slightly stronger than procedural fairness: whilst procedural 
fairness is more important in increasing workers’ satisfaction, distributive fairness 
seems to impact more heavily on their desire to stay. In some cases, workers dissatisfied 
with procedures may prefer to stay when the distribution of resources is equitable.27  
Procedural and distributive fairness do not seem to substitute for satisfaction in the 
definition of workers’ desire to stay. Only in the case of relational satisfaction does the 
significance decrease from the 1 percent level to the 10 percent level. Relational 
satisfaction can to a certain extent be equated with procedural fairness since good 
relations usually accompany fair procedures, and this idea could support the result. No 
other important changes are to be highlighted, except for a slight decrease in the 
significance of the quality of relations between organization and clients, and a slight 
increase in the significance of tenure, which is now positively linked with workers’ 
desire to stay.28 Overall, both estimates concerning overall job satisfaction and loyalty 
to the organization support the hypothesis put forth in Section 2: justice does not seem 
to substitute incentives mixes, but it is likely to pertain to workers’ assessment of the 
processes taking place within the organization, more than to actual decisions (outcomes) 
implemented in order to motivate them. 
 
Table 14 about here 
 
In the case of both worker satisfaction and loyalty to the organization, introducing the 
indexes of justice improves the fit of the model. The value of the log-likelihood function 
increases, and so does the value of the chi-squared statistic and the value of the pseudo-
R2. The increase in significance in the case of worker satisfaction is particularly large, 
indicating that fairness has a stronger explanatory capacity for satisfaction than for 
loyalty.   
To sum up this section, the perception of justice within the organization is the most 
crucial element in defining workers’ satisfaction and the strength of their relation with 
the organization. Intrinsic, relational, and economic attitudes should be added to justice 
as important elements influencing workers’ general level of satisfaction. As for 
workers’ loyalty, satisfaction (extrinsic, economic, and relational) more than attitudes 
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 appears to be crucial, together with fairness, which emerges as an independent criterion 
used by workers to evaluate fair processes within the organization. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Empirical analysis of data collected on the Italian social services confirms that 
organizational forms differ in the incentive mixes supplied to workers, especially as far 
as intrinsic and relational incentives are concerned. Yet worker perceptions of the 
fairness of incentives mixes are likely to be of even greater weight. 
The incentive mixes put in place by different organizational forms differ in important 
ways. Some organizations seem to be weaker in all respects in the manner in which they 
are able to reconcile incentives (first and foremost monetary ones) and worker 
satisfaction, while others have strengths and weaknesses. More specifically, public 
organizations seem to give more weight to economic incentives, but score lowest in 
almost all respects when workers satisfaction is taken into account, also as regards 
extrinsic and monetary incentives. For-profit firms rely mainly on extrinsic incentives, 
which are likely to be the main means by which they motivate workers. Nonprofit 
organizations seem to base their incentive mixes relatively more on relational and 
intrinsic motives. Social cooperatives distinguish themselves as the organizational form 
which places the greatest weight on participation and intrinsic motivation. NPOs are 
able to obtain the highest degree of worker satisfaction on most of the items considered, 
their disadvantage in the field of monetary remuneration notwithstanding. 
The account of the variables that influence workers’ satisfaction and loyalty to the 
organization is greatly improved when perceived fairness, mainly at the procedural but 
also at the distributive level, is added. Workers care greatly about the fairness of 
processes within the organization. This is the case at the distributive level, where 
workers, given their economic expectations, rate the fairness of their remuneration level 
in relation to their experience, skills, and delivered effort but also in comparison with 
the income of their reference group (usually fellow workers). The simple level of their 
salary seems not to play a significant role. However, this is all the more true in relation 
to procedures followed by the management in assigning tasks and evaluating their 
results, communicating evaluations and defining career prospects. Procedural fairness 
emerges as a key element in explaining workers’ satisfaction. Social cooperatives, 
compared to public organizations and for-profit firms, but also to the other nonprofit 
organizations, seem to be the organizational forms best able to convince workers of the 
fairness of implemented decisions, thus compensating for the disadvantage at the level 
of monetary remuneration. Worker participation and fairer decisions, intrinsic 
motivations and overall job satisfaction seem to find a better equilibrium in this kind of 
organization. 
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 Appendix A. Principal components analysis on the items of worker satisfaction 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
Component Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
of 
Variance% 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.392 33.783 33.783 2.557 19.666 19.666 
2 1.476 11.355 45.138 2.514 19.337 39.003 
3 1.096 8.429 53.567 1.893 14.564 53.567 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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 Component Matrix(a) 
 
Component 
  1 2 3 
Professional 
development .629     
decision-making 
autonomy .642   -.364 
Recognition of one’s 
contribution .669   -.330 
variety and creativity 
of the job .601   -.406 
working environment .621     
the social usefulness of 
the job .526     
the salary .548   .423 
working hours .586     
previous career 
advancements .541 -.615 .303 
future career 
advancements .525 -.615   
job security .444 .451   
relations with superiors .633 .320   
relations with 
colleagues .551 .405   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
a  3 components extracted. 
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 Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
 
Component 
  1 2 3 
Professional 
development   .664   
decision-making 
autonomy   .712   
recognition of one’s 
contribution   .688   
variety and creativity 
of the job   .713   
working environment .568     
the social usefulness of 
the job  .486   
the salary .485   .494 
working hours .636     
previous career 
advancements     .842 
future career 
advancements     .833 
job security .694     
relations with superiors .639    
relations with 
colleagues
.647     
 23
 colleagues 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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 End Notes 
 
1. These are enterprises in which ownership and therefore governance rights are assigned to the workers 
or to a mix of workers and volunteers. Besides these types, social cooperatives also comprise other 
ownership mixes – for example, consumers and workers, consumers and voluntary workers – but at 
the moment these are in the minority and will therefore not be considered here. 
2. The importance of information asymmetries in the supply of social services as the basis for the 
development of non-profit organizations has been emphasized by Hansmann (1996), as well as by 
various other authors, including Turati (2001). The public nature of the services furnished by non-
profit organizations was initially stressed by Weisbrod (1975, 1977). In this perspective we should 
single out theories à la Weisbrod based on the public nature of goods produced by non-profit 
organizations and introduce them as a third possible explanation. However, we prefer to keep the 
analysis as simple as possible by referring exclusively to the “asymmetric information paradigm” 
originated by Hansmann. The reason is that the production of public goods supplied by NPOs very 
often present important problems linked to asymmetric information; hence, for our purposes, the two 
explanations can be conflated together. 
3. A possible explanation for the low pay levels in social enterprises is that, although at the moment 
wages are relatively low, the social services sector is still too segmented, with significant barriers 
against the integration of supply and therefore against the economies of scale and scope that could 
derive from it. 
4. Among authors more skeptical as to whether non-profit organizations represent valid alternatives to 
public organizations and for-profit enterprises in the production of social services are Glaeser and 
Shleifer (2001), Ortmann and Schleisinger (2003) and Hansmann himself (2003). 
5. The dataset was produced by  ISSAN, Institute for the Development of Nonprofit Organizations, 
University of Trento, in collaboration with FIVOL, Italian Foundation for Voluntary Work, and FEO, 
European Foundation for Employment. It was based on four questionnaires (for enterprises, 
managers, paid workers and voluntary workers) distributed to 228 organizations (268 production 
units) and 2066 workers. 
6. The table shows three average values. Further analysis highlights different pay structures, for 
example by tenure. For longer tenured workers the gap between private and public sectors tends to 
diminish. Recalling the fact that many non profit organizations came into being in the 1990s, an 
important part of the public/private wage differential can be explained on the basis of shorter 
workers’ tenure. 
7. Only in for-profit enterprises was this aspect slightly less important than job security. 
8. Close involvement is not just theoretical, for social cooperatives are in practice the organizations that 
most closely involve their workers, mainly in the social base and in management bodies. 
9. This is confirmed by the positive and significant correlation between the general level of satisfaction 
with the job and satisfaction with the wage. 
10. Only 13 percent of workers gave scores higher than four (on a Lickert scale from one to seven) when 
asked if they had chosen the organization because of higher remuneration. 
11. This contrasts with the findings of Mirvis and Hackett (1983), who for the US found higher female 
than male satisfaction in the 1970s. Their main conclusion is that women’s satisfaction is boosted by 
weaker working position and lower expectations about professional role and pay. 
12. Scrutiny of likelihood ratios by means of STATA logistic confirms the results. The variables that 
present the highest likelihood ratios (higher than 1.1) are primarily the items of satisfaction (extrinsic, 
economic, and relational). Also the quality of relations with clients shows a high ratio, while the 
highest ratio (1.66) is found for workers on open-ended contract, and the lowest for the public nature 
of the organization (0.68), which is the variable most likely to decrease workers’ loyalty.  
13. The second logit estimation in table 6 in this paper refers to the desire to stay with the organization 
for at least some years. The results are very similar to those from the previous estimation, apart from 
the fact that in the shorter the quality of relations between organization and clients do not influence 
loyalty, while women are more loyal. 
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 14. Two logit estimates were performed in Borzaga and Depedri (2004). In the first, only motivations 
were introduced, while in the second motivations were substituted by the items of satisfaction. 
Among motivations, only intrinsic ones emerged as significantly linked with loyalty. Extrinsic, 
economic and relational motivations were not significant. When consideration was made of the 
satisfaction items, extrinsic and relational satisfaction emerged as the most relevant. In table 6 we 
consider only the items that were most significant in previous elaboration. The biggest difference in 
results is that, this time, intrinsic motivation become insignificant. Given the strong link between 
intrinsic motivations and relational satisfaction, evidenced both by means of simple correlation 
coefficients and by means of probit estimation (Borzaga and Depedri, 2004), a possible explanation 
for the result is that workers with the strongest intrinsic motivations tend to develop better relations 
on the job. However, the final result of the process (better relations) is more important in influencing 
loyalty than intrinsic motivations. 
15. Moreover, even compared to the other types of nonprofits, social cooperatives are characterized by 
closer involvement in the organization, by mutuality and the principles connected with it. Though 
beyond the scope of this paper, the interconnections between participation, intrinsic motivations, and 
intrinsic satisfaction should be analyzed in more depth. 
16. Categorical principal components analysis (CatPCA) was first performed. Categorical data 
transformed into numerical data by means of alternating least squares (ALS) were then used to 
perform principal components analysis. 
17. All the components having eigenvalues higher than one were considered. 
18. The second component was named “intrinsic incentives” even if it included professional 
development, which was not included among the items of intrinsic satisfaction. The label depends on 
the clear prevalence of the items of intrinsic satisfaction within the component. Besides, professional 
development may contribute at least partly to intrinsic satisfaction. 
19. Reliability test were carried out by means of Cronbach’s alpha calculated on the various components 
emerging as significant. To this end coefficients higher than 0.3 were selected. Cronbach’s alpha was 
equal respectively to 0.72, 0.76, and 0.68. In the case of the third component, if the salary (the least 
significant variable) was dropped, alpha increased to 0.78. These values do not respect the highest 
standards of reliability for singling out second level or hidden dimensions, which are usually fixed at 
0.8. However, all three components showed a good degree of reliability. 
20. In Table 7 career advancements were included among extrinsic items of satisfaction, while in factor 
analysis they appear in the third, independent factor. Hence workers satisfaction concerning career 
advancement shows a relevant heterogeneity with respect to the other extrinsic aspects of the job. 
21. See appendix A for further details and the numerical output of the analysis. 
22. Note that by ‘procedural fairness’ is meant the perception of justice, good-quality internal 
communications and transparency in career advancements and the treatment of workers. 
23. The indexes are the average scores calculated on the various items representing procedural and 
distributive justice, as represented in table 13. 
24. The correlations coefficients between the indexes of procedural and distributive justice and workers’ 
satisfaction were both equal to about 0.4. I 
25. In order to assess the relative goodness of fit of the two models concerning satisfaction, the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) can be used (Long, 1997, pp. 109-113). The difference in the BICs from 
the two models indicates which model is more likely to have generated the observed data. Using the 
version of the BIC that is equal to D(M)-df*lnN, where D is the scaled deviance of the model M and 
it is equal to -2ln L(M), where L(M) is the log likelihood function of the model. df are the degrees of 
freedom of the saturated model, equal to the sample size minus the number of parameters on the 
model M. N is the number of observations. The difference between the BICs for the two models in 
question was equal to 349.28 and indicated that the second model is more likely to have generated 
the observed data than the first. It should be stressed that the difference is particularly marked and 
indicates an important increase in the fit of the model when the indexes of justice are added. 
26. The results on the desire to stay with the organization for at least some years do not exhibit 
fundamental differences. 
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 27. The analysis of likelihood ratios by means of STATA logistic confirms what was found in the first 
estimation. The two indexes of justice show likelihood ratio higher than 1.1, but lower than 1.2. The 
highest ratio is again the one shown by workers on open-end contracts (1.77), while to lowest is to be 
attributed to the public nature of the organization (0.68). 
28. Calculating the difference in the Bayesian Information Criteria (BICs) for the two models concerning 
workers’ willingness to stay as long as possible, a value of 16.93 is found. It indicates that the second 
model is more likely to have generated the observed data than the first one. 
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 Table 1. Workers’ characteristics by organizational form 
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Gender        
Male 15.4 12.7 29.3 31.1 20.2 22.9 
Female 84.6 87.3 70,7 68,9 79,8 77,1 
Age       
Less than 25 years old 5.2 9.0 8.8 2.1 7.0 6.1 
25 to 30 11.5 17.5 27.5 17,4 15,5 18,3 
30 to 39 37.4 45.5 39 41.3 39,4 39.7 
40 to 49 35.2 15.3  17.3 26.9 24.9 25.3 
More than 50 years old 10.7 12.7 7.4 12.3 13.1 10.36 
Educational attainment        
Elementary school 4.6 10.8 4.8 4.3 7.3 5.5 
Lower intermediate diploma 18.7 26.6 21 15.7 36.2 21.3 
Technical education 30.9 18.7 14 10.7 16.1 19 
High-school diploma 33.2 30.5 42.9 44.4 28.9 37.7 
University degree or higher 12.5 13.3 17.4 24.8 11.5 16.5 
Contractual relation       
Part-time 86.6 84.8 70.5 76.4 82.3 79.1 
Full-time 13.4 15.2 29.5 23.6 17.7 20.9 
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 Table 2. Workers’ satisfaction* 
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The job as a whole 4.99 5.39 5.39 5.25 5.53 5.26 
(*) The interviewees chose a value from a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
 
 
Table 3. Loyalty to the organization by nature of the organization (percent) 
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Intend to stay as long as possible .37 .49 .47 .51 .63 .47 
Intend to stay at least for some years .13 .11 .18 .12 .08 .13 
Quit the organization if a better job opportunity 
in the same sector is found .22 .17 .15 .14 .12 .17 
Quit the organization if a better job opportunity 
also in a different in sector is found .17 .20 .14 .22 .14 .17 
Leave the organization as soon as possible  .03 .01 .01 .00 .01 .01 
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 Table 4. Workers’ pay in the social services sector by type of organization (average 
values in Euros) 
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Monthly pay      
Full-time 901.40 798.84 768.24 856.76 758.69 
Part-time 549.12 608.35 502.33 627.34 543.91 
Hourly pay      
Full-time 6.29 5.37 5.14 5.96 5.28 
Part-time 6.75 9.07 6.22 7.38 5.65 
 
 
 
Tab.5. Attitudes towards the work and the organization* 
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Attitudes towards work       
Intrinsic aspects       
An opportunity for self-fulfillment 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.6 
A contribution to society  4.3 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.3 
Extrinsic aspects        
A necessity 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.6 
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 A hobby 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.1 
A way to gain recognition 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.6 
Economic aspects       
To earn a living 5.7 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.7 
To earn as much as possible 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.8 3.3 2.9 
To support the family 5.5 5.7 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.4 
Relational aspects       
An opportunity to form new 
relationships 
4.9 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.9 4.8 
Choice of organization        
Intrinsic       
Interest in the sector 5.3 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.4 
way in which it works with users 3.8 4.0 4.6 4.7 5.0 4.4 
Workforce involvement  3.1 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.5 
Extrinsic        
Match with training 4.6 4.2 4.3 4.9 4.4 4.5 
Compatibility with other 
commitments 
4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 5.0 4.5 
Job security 4.5 5.2 3.4 3.7 4.9 4.1 
Economic       
Pay and career 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 
Relational       
Getting to know other workers 2.8 2.6 3.4 3.7 3.7 3.2 
Getting to know users 2.0 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.3 
Only job available 3.6 4.0 3.4 3.3 4.2 3.6 
(*) The interviewees chose a value from a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
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 Table 6 – Satisfaction with the job as a whole (ordered probit) 
 
Variables a  Coef. Z P[|Z|>z] Sign. ° 
Age .0043 1.51 .132  
Gender  
(male=0, female=1) 
-.0478 -.85 .396  
Level of education  
(incremental variable from lower secondary school 
certificate to degree or MA) 
-.1070 -5.47 .000 *** 
Hourly wage .0093 .83 .405  
Activity in direct contact with clients 
(1=activity in direct contact with clients, 0= other activities) 
.1569 2.53 .012 ** 
Time spent with clients .1156 6.04 .000 *** 
Tenure in the organization (years) -.0087 -2.44 .015 ** 
Presence of volunteers .0223 .39 .699  
Quality of organization/clients relations d .0238 .95 .341  
Nature of the organization 
(0=private organization , 1=public organization)  
-.2604 -4.04 .000 *** 
Intrinsic attitudes d .1766 10.36 .000 *** 
Other extrinsic attitudes d -.0195 -.82 .413  
Economic attitudes (interest in the wage) d -.0484 -2.43 .015 ** 
Relational attitudes d .0548 3.8 .000 *** 
a Variables signed by d are discrete and range from 1 (min) to 7 (max). All other 
variables are continuous. 
° Significance: ***=less than 1%, **=less than 5%, *=less than 10%. 
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 Maximum likelihood estimates: Observations 2066; Iterations completed 3; Log 
likelihood function –3424.297; Chi-squared 268.81; Degrees of freedom 14; Pseudo 
R2=0.0378; Significance level .0000 
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 Table 7. Loyalty to the organization (logit estimation)* 
 The worker intends to… 
 Stay in the organization as 
long as possible 
Stay in the organization at least 
for some years  
Variables a Coeff. P[|Z|>z] Sign.° Coeff. P[|Z|>z] Sign.° 
Constant -3.844 0.000 *** -3.302 0.000 *** 
Age 0.041 0.000 *** 0.053 0.000 *** 
Gender 
(0=male, 1=female) 
-0.091 0.432  -0.280 0.022 ** 
Level of education  
(incremental variable from lower secondary school 
certificate to university degree or MA) 
-0.158 0.000 *** -0.100 0.015 ** 
Labor contract 
(0= other type of contract, 1= open-end contract) 
0.469 0.000 *** 0.521 0.000 *** 
Hourly wage -0.002 0.930  -0.018 0.431  
Tenure in the organization (years) 0.013 0.095 * 0.000 0.987  
Presence of volunteers 0.057 0.632  0.174 0.164  
Quality of organization/clients relations d 0.101 0.062 ** 0.067 0.225  
Public organization versus private 
(0=public organization, 1=private organization) 
-0.419 0.002 *** -0.371 0.008 *** 
Intrinsic attitudes 0.024 0.473  -0.027 0.427  
Satisfaction with other extrinsic goods d 0.275 0.000 *** 0.381 0.000 *** 
Economic satisfaction (interest in the wage) d 0.171 0.000 *** 0.089 0.041 *** 
Relational satisfaction d 0.121 0.005 *** 0.139 0.001 ** 
a Variables signed with d are discrete variables ranging from 1(min) to 7 (max). All 
other variables  are continuous. 
 ° Significance: ***= less than 1%, **= less than 5%, *= less than 10%.. 
Intention to stay as long as possible: 
 38
 Observations 2066; Iterations completed 4; Log likelihood function -1260.128; LR 
Chi-squared 342.42; Degrees of freedom 13; Pseudo R2=0.1196; Significance level 
.0000 
Intention to stay at least for some years: 
Observations 2066; Iterations completed 5; Log likelihood function -1196.546;LR  
Chi-squared 354.63; Degrees of freedom 13;Pseudo R2=0.1291; Significance level 
.0000 
 
 
Table 8. Satisfaction with extrinsic aspects of work by type of organization * 
Satisfaction with … 
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The job as a whole 5.00 5.34 5.39 5.31 5.53 5.27 
Professional development 4.15 4.03 4.99 4.45 4.72 4.50 
Work environment  4.07 4.77 4.53 4.54 5.06 4.48 
Wage 4.02 4.19 3.78 4.17 4.64 4.07 
Working hours 4.58 4.58 4.97 4.89 5.07 4.81 
Career advancements achieved 2.47 3.05 3.54 3.23 3.37 3.10 
Future career advancements 2.28 2.85 3.49 2.99 3.11 2.93 
Job security 4.72 5.33 4.25 4.58 5.46 4.70 
(*)The interviewees chose a value on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
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 Table 9. Satisfaction with the intrinsic aspects of the work by type of organization * 
Satisfaction with … 
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The job as a whole 5.00 5.34 5.39 5.31 5.53 5.27 
Decision-making autonomy 3.99 4.01 4.77 4.38 4.56 4.36 
Recognition of one’s contribution 4.17 4.29 4.90 4.56 4.79 4.54 
Variety and creativity of the job 4.40 4.20 4.95 4.65 4.77 4.63 
The social usefulness of the job 5.16 5.32 5.34 5.40 5.49 5.31 
(*)The interviewees chose a value on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum).. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Satisfaction with the relational aspects of the work by type of organization *  
Satisfaction with … 
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The job as a whole 5.00 5.34 5.39 5.31 5.53 5.27 
Relations with superiors 4.72 5.34 5.40 5.18 5.61 5.17 
Relations with colleagues 5.22 5.65 5.69 5.59 5.56 5.51 
Relations with volunteers 5.17 4.91 5.45 5.66 5.79 5.47 
(*)The interviewees chose a value on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
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 Table 11. Grouping the items of satisfaction (principal components analysis)a  
  Component 
  1 2 3 
 relational and 
extrinsic 
incentives 
intrinsic 
incentives economic incentives 
Professional development  .664  
Decision-making autonomy  .712  
recognition of one’s contribution  .688  
variety and creativity of the job  .713  
working environment .568   
the social usefulness of the job  .486  
the salary .485  .494 
working hours .636   
previous career advancements   .842 
future career advancements   .833 
job security .694   
relations with superiors .639   
relations with colleagues .647   
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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 Table 12 - Fairness in relations with the organization by the nature of the same (average 
scores)* 
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Distributive fairness       
Responsibility 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.0 
Training 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.0 
Experience 3.6 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.0 
Effort 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.3 3.8 
Quality of the work 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.5 3.9 
Stress and tension 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.4 
Economic resources of the 
Organization  
3.5 3.7 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.2 
Average score   3.46 3.74 4.11 4.07 4.30 3.90 
       
Procedural fairness       
Incentives/contribution balance 2.5 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.1 
Communication 3.9 5.0 5.0 4.2 4.8 4.5 
Career 2.2 3.0 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Being listened to 3.3 4.2 4.7 4.1 4.4 4.1 
Growth 3.3 3.9 4.7 4.2 4.5 4.1 
Transparency of promotions  2.1 3.0 3.6 3.0 3.2 3.0 
Average score  2.88 3.73 4.25 3.62 3.90 3.65 
(*)The interviewees chose a value on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
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 Table 13 – Satisfaction with the job as a whole (ordered probit) 
 Considering perceived fairness  Without 
considering 
perceived fairness 
Variables a  Coeff. Z P[|Z|>z
] 
Sign. ° Z Sign. 
° 
Age 0.003 0.980 0.328  0.0043  
Gender  
(male=0, female=1) 
0.047 0.820 0.412  -0.0478  
Level of education  
(incremental variable from lower secondary 
school certificate to degree or MA) 
-0.081 -4.060 0.000 *** -0.1070 *** 
Hourly wage -0.003 -0.270 0.784  0.0093  
Tenure in the organization (years) -0.002 -0.650 0.517  -0.0087 ** 
Presence of volunteers  -0.049 -0.850 0.398  0.0223  
Activity in direct contact with clients 0.024 0.380 0.707  0.1569 ** 
Time spent with clients 0.111 5.700 0.000 *** 0.1156 *** 
Quality of organization/clients relations d 0.002 0.070 0.948  0.0238  
Nature of the organization 
(0=private organization , 1=public 
organization)  
-0.007 -0.110 0.913  -0.2604 *** 
Intrinsic attitudes d 0.126 7.220 0.000 *** 0.1766 *** 
Other extrinsic attitudes d -0.065 -2.670 0.008 *** -0.0195  
Economic attitudes (interest in the wage) d -0.048 -2.380 0.017 ** -0.0484 ** 
Relational attitudes d 0.056 3.850 0.000 *** 0.0548 *** 
Procedural fairness 0.286 12.820 0.000 ***   
Distributive fairness  0.151 8.450 0.000 ***   
a Variables signed by d are discrete and range from 1 (min) to 7 (max). All other 
variables are continuous. 
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° Significance: ***=less than 1%, **=less than 5%, *=less than 10%. 
 Maximum likelihood estimates: Observations 1946; Iterations completed 3; Log 
likelihood function –3226.538; LR Chi-squared 664.33; Degrees of freedom 16; Pseudo 
R2=0.0933 Significance level .0000 
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 Table 14 - Loyalty to the organization (logit estimation)* 
 The worker intends to stay in the organization as long as possible 
 Considering perceived fairness Without considering 
perceived fairness 
Variables a Coeff. Z P[|Z|>z] Sign. 2 Coeff. Sign. 2 
Constant -4.465 -6.950 0.000 *** -3.844 *** 
Age 0.041 6.560 0.000 *** 0.041 *** 
Gender 
(0=male, 1=female) 
-0.030 -0.250 0.801  -0.091  
Level of education  
(incremental variable from lower secondary school 
certificate to university degree or MA) 
-0.140 -3.490 0.000 *** -0.158 *** 
Labor contract 
(0= other type of contract, 1= open-end contract) 
0.535 4.530 0.000 *** 0.469 *** 
Hourly wage -0.008 -0.340 0.733  -0.002  
Tenure in the organization (years) 0.016 2.040 0.041 ** 0.013 * 
Presence of volunteers 0.006 0.050 0.960  0.057  
Quality of organization/clients relations d 0.091 1.670 0.095 * 0.101 ** 
Public organization versus private 
(0=public organization, 1=private organization) 
-0.319 -2.280 0.023 ** -0.419 *** 
Intrinsic attitudes 0.015 0.430 0.667  0.024  
Satisfaction with other extrinsic goods d 0.151 2.750 0.006 *** 0.275 *** 
Economic satisfaction (interest in the wage) d 0.116 2.760 0.006 *** 0.121 *** 
Relational satisfaction d 0.081 1.820 0.070 * 0.171 *** 
Procedural fairness 0.146 2.850 0.004 ***   
Distributive fairness 0.171 4.340 0.000 ***   
a Variables signed with d are discrete variables ranging from 1(min) to 7 (max). All 
other variables  are continuous. 
 
  ° Significance: ***= less than 1%, **= less than 5%, *= less than 10%.. 
Observations 2066; Iterations completed 5; Log likelihood function -1242.343; LR 
Chi-squared 377.99; Degrees of freedom 15; Pseudo R2=0.132; Significance level .0000 
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Figure 1 - The origin of social enterprises 
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